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This paper showcases negative results of two common theories surrounding United States 
cotton literature. It has been proposed that the amount of land available to the U.S. South 
allowed for lucrative expansion that other nations physically could not obtain. Others have 
proposed that the United States created an effective labor system that created immense 
productivity and, as a result, prosperity. However, our findings suggest that the United States 
was not more productive than Egypt and that it did not benefit from a spatial fix. These negative 
findings contribute to an understanding of why the South prospered using a system of labor that 
has economically retarded other nations by eliminating theories commonly proposed by the 
literature. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper address two common theories on the success of the cotton economy in the 
United States’ South. A critical component of the United States economy is the dominant cotton 
economy that arose in the 18th and 19th centuries. The superior cotton industry of the United 
States continued after the Civil War into the 20th century and it provided ample investment that 
contributed to the industrialization of the North. Typically, the literature contrasts the United 
States with less developed nations, namely Egypt, although India and Brazil are also commonly 
mentioned. Traditional explanations produced less than satisfying explanations. Time and labor 
constraints prevent us from running a full analysis of this phenomenon. However, two 
particularly important theories that conceivably explain why the United States prospered and 
Egypt did not are the spatial fix theory and the economic advantage of slavery over other systems 
of coerced labor.  
 
In order to test why the United States succeeded where Egypt did not, we analyzed the 
theory of David Harvey’s spatial fix and ran a comparative productivity analysis to see whether 
the United States was more productive than Egypt. Though the literature indicated that both the 
U.S. spatial fix and high United States productivity were factors that contributed to United States 
prosperity, our study reports negative findings.  
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Background 
United States Cotton Industry 
Originally, the American slavery system revolved around tobacco and rice. However, the 
British Industrial Revolution created an insatiable demand for cotton. This demand, coupled with 
the continual decline in world tobacco and rice markets and the implementation of new 
technology, including Whitney’s cotton gin, encouraged American farmers to grow short-staple 
cotton. Labor-intensive cotton growth spurred a recommitment to the institution of slavery in the 
U.S. South, which in turn, created substantial economic growth in the United States South. By 
1840, the South supplied three-fourths of the world’s cotton (Johnson 2007). After the Civil War, 
a system of debt peonage essentially replaced the slave system in terms of agricultural labor and 
the United States remained the world’s dominant producer of cotton.  
 
History of Egypt 
Egypt’s cotton industry tells a different story. In the early 19th century, Egypt was a 
grain-centered economy. However, once their population began to grow exponentially, they 
lowered their exported amount of grains due to internal consumption and began to commercially 
produce cotton. The fertility of Egypt’s land gave it the ability to cultivate what is now popularly 
known as Egyptian cotton. Egyptian cotton has a long staple length of about 1 ¼ inches and is 
known for its “strength, luster, and silky appearance” (Norris 1934). Egypt quickly became 
ranked as one of the highest cotton producing countries in the world. American states that 
produced long-staple cotton similar to Egypt’s cotton would be forced to meet the standards of 
Egyptian cotton and depended on changes in the crop size of Egyptian cotton (Norris 1934).  
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During the American Civil War, demand for Egyptian cotton in Europe increased due to 
America’s decreased cotton exportation. Egyptian cotton prices rose exponentially in response to 
this rise in demand. Once the Civil War ended and America began to export cotton into Europe 
once again, Egypt’s cotton industry plummeted. In 1879, Europe used this time to colonize 
Egypt and gain control of their cotton industry. Europe kept control over the cotton industry until 
1922, when Egypt gained their independence. Once their independence was obtained, the 
Egyptians continued to rely on cotton as their main export and the country remained one of the 
leading cotton exporters. Yet, Egypt did not develop into a world power like the United States. 
  
Coerced Labor in Egypt 
Once cotton became a major Egyptian export, large estates began to take the land that 
was given to peasants under religious laws. Since profits were best noticed when they were 
grown on large estates, Egypt began to transition from small scale farming to large estates (Bent 
2015). The creation of these large estates resulted in changes of their property right agreements. 
Originally, Islamic laws gave peasants certain property rights. However, the Egyptian elites, the 
Khedives, used their large estate development to take these rights away and transform most of 
the land into private property (Bent 2015). Many peasants ended up owning little to no land, 
causing them to have to work for the large estates. Instead of giving the peasants wages, most 
estates gave peasants a little plot of land for them to farm.  
 
However, peasants were not satisfied with this system because they were paid in tax 
credits instead of actual wages once they sold their cotton. This meant that any currency they 
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received underwent high inflation, and therefore it was not sold for market value. Another reason 
the laborers were unsatisfied was due to their limited labor on these farms. Many peasants were 
also forced into corvee labor. This labor meant the peasants were sent to work on other projects, 
such as building canals, which hindered their planting of cotton and subsistence crops. The 
majority of these projects did not benefit them, due to their placement away from their villages, 
and they would have to supply their own food and supplies with little to no compensation.  
 
Peasants rebelled against these conditions with “lethargy and surreptitious resistance”, in 
addition to running away and mutilating themselves (Alleaume 1999). Others fled to Syria while 
a small number attempted to fight against this rule, but the rebellions were put down easily. The 
peasants did not find an effective solution to this problem and their conditions did not change 
until the 20th century. 
 
Coerced Labor in the United States  
 The early United States cotton industry was almost entirely dependent on the labor of 
enslaved African Americans, though planters occasionally employed hired hands as well. In 
1808, the United States outlawed the importation of slaves into the country. Thus planters relied 
on interregional slave trade to supply their labor force. Enslaved African Americans were 
considered property, or chattel. Enslaved men, women, and children were forced to work their 
masters’ fields from sunrise to sunset for no pay. Slaves lived on their masters’ plantations and 
were afforded no rights by U.S. law. Under the slavery system, countless African Americans 
endured physical and mental abuse and many were murdered. The law allowed a master to treat 
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his property in any way that he desired. The desire to make a profit from cotton led to one of the 
darkest human rights chapters in history.  
 
During the Reconstruction Era, a system of debt peonage effectively replaced slavery as 
the source of cotton labor. In a system of debt peonage, or debt slavery, an indentured servant 
works to pay off a debt to their employer. Although debt peonage was technically outlawed in 
the United States in 1867, African Americans found themselves in the system through non-
traditional methods. For instance, some employers gave their workers advanced pay, paid for 
transportation costs or living expenses, gave sharecropping loans, paid legal fees, extended 
credit, etc. (PBS 2012). These loans trapped many African Americans in debt that they could 
never fully repay. As a result, cotton plantations employed many African Americans for no 
wages. The United States cotton industry continued with a system of labor that looked roughly 
identical to traditional slavery. 
 
Theories 
Spatial Fix Theory 
Our first theory deals with the concept of land availability. David Harvey examines the 
concept of a spatial fix in The Limits to Capital (1982). Capitalism creates contradictions 
between the forces and relations of production. Moving to a new space and utilizing the new 
space to create fresh, viable activity provides a repair for this dysfunctional relationship (Harvey 
1982).  Jason Moore supports this notion in Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the 
Accumulation of Capital (2015). Moore believes that the agricultural industry is particularly 
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subject to stagnation, and therefore is more dependent on spatial renewal (2015).  
 
One of the most controversial attempts at explaining these contrasting outcomes comes 
from Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman’s 1974 Time on the Cross: The Economics 
of American Negro Slavery. Though many of the theories and much of the methodology of Time 
on the Cross have been debunked, the work proposes several factors of United States cotton 
production that continue to persist in modern literature and pose questions relevant to our 
research. Fogel and Engerman examine the importance of technology, soil, and the size of cotton 
farm as crucial factors in productivity. 
 
 Perhaps most importantly, Fogel and Engerman discuss the “natural limits” thesis 
(1974). Time on the Cross declares that slavery required territorial expansion to remain 
profitable. According to Fogel and Engerman, since slavery led to “rapid soil exhaustion,” an 
acceptable level of productivity could be only maintained by “continuously bringing new land 
into production” (1974). The “natural limits” thesis falls directly in line with the concept of a 
spatial fix that is supported by other literature.  
 
Further examining secondary sources gave a strong indication that territorial expansion 
allowed the United States to excel in ways that other nations could not. In Empire of Cotton: A 
Global History, Steven Beckert writes that “what distinguished the United States from virtually 
every other cotton-growing area in the world was planters’ command of nearly unlimited 
supplies of land, labor, and capital, and their unparalleled political power” (Beckert 2014). 
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Furthermore, “the territorial expansion...was tightly linked to the territorial ambitions of planting, 
manufacturing, and finance capitalists. Cotton planters constantly pushed the boundaries, seeking 
fresh lands to grow cotton” (Beckert 2014). Additionally, Beckert cites cotton planters who 
asserted that a plot of land could not be used for cotton production for more than a few years. 
Plots that previously produced a thousand pounds of cotton would bring in only half as much the 
next year (2014).  Thus, the concept of a spatial fix is supported by the United States cotton 
industry literature. 
 
Finally, Engerman and Sokoloff’s “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of 
Development Among New World Economics” explores the United States’ factor endowment and 
the role of land in the development of the United States (2002). As opposed to the United States, 
“approximately 97 percent of [Egypt]… is of no agricultural value. The remaining area… 
supports 98 percent of the population” and “the productive area is limited to the valley and delta 
of the Nile River” (United States Department of Agriculture 1934). Owen explains their possible 
ability to expand by claiming the only reason total crop area may exceed the area under 
cultivation is due to the extensive system of double cropping (Owen 1969). Due to their double 
cropping and irrigation system, “[Egypt’s] rapid economic growth ended in the early 1900s. The 
supply of readily available land had been largely exhausted” (US Library of Congress). Having 
an abundance of workable land is an asset to agricultural economies because of soil depletion. 
When lands become unsuitable for agricultural, territorial expansion becomes necessary.  
 
Additional sources assert the link between the survival of the cotton industry and 
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territorial expansion. Andrew Torget claims that a “massive expansion of American cotton 
farming” required “expanding that cotton frontier...,” and even documents attempts by cotton 
farmers to expand into Mexico (Torget 2015). Moreover, Gene Dattel states “from 1800 to 1860 
cotton production provoked human and territorial expansion at a blistering pace...cotton was the 
most important proximate cause of expansion” (Dattel 2011). In other words, the amount of 
serviceable acres is imperative in assessing the viability of an agricultural society. The territorial 
expansion of cotton is believed to have been a major component in the industry’s productivity.  
 
The Proposed Economic Advantage of Slavery over Other Systems of Coerced Labor 
This research will also consist of the exploration of the relationship between coerced 
labor, productivity and economic growth. Historically, nations that rely on coerced labor have 
failed to industrialize (Williams 1994). However, the South became very wealthy despite 
possessing an economy dependent on slave labor (Fogel, Engerman 1974). However, some of the 
literature indicates that the United States was productive not in spite of slavery, but because of it. 
Fogel and Engerman assert that the American slavery system was economically beneficial. The 
book challenges the idea that American slavery was unprofitable and inefficient; instead it claims 
that American slavery provided a mutually beneficial economic relationship between owner and 
slave (Engerman and Fogel 1974). 
 
 Edward Baptist’s The Half that Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of 
American Capitalism explores the importance of slavery in the creation of the United States’ 
success. Baptist rightfully acknowledges that the 18th and 19th century Southern economy, and 
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the U.S.’s subsequent economic success, was due to the labor of enslaved African Americans. 
However, Baptist also makes claims about the economic viability of the forced labor system. 
Baptist claims,  “Slavery’s expansion...multiplied the incredible productivity and profitability of 
enslaved people’s labor and allowed slavers to turn bodies into commodities with which they 
changed the financial history of the Western World” (Baptist 2014).  In other words, as slavery 
expanded, Baptist believed that productivity increased. Furthermore, “The data of declining 
productivity over the ensuing three score and ten years suggested that slavery might have been 
the most efficient way to produce the world’s most important crop”  (Baptist 2014). If slavery is 
equated with efficiency and productivity, then the United States was able to prosper because of 
brutality.  
 
Beckert, in Empire of Cotton, echoes Baptist’s claims. Beckert states, “slave owners 
secured these productivity gains by taking almost total control of the world process- a direct 
result of the violent domination of their workers” (2014). Additionally, “the all-encompassing 
control of workers...experienced its first great success on the cotton plantations of the American 
South” (2014). The bleak narrative being perpetuated across the cotton literature is that the 
United States was able to be successful because the inhumanity of its slave system gave it 
advantages that other counties could not obtain.  
 
The idea of beating slaves into productivity appears in slave narratives as well. John 
Brown, who was a fugitive slave, said that “when the [cotton] price rises in the English market, 
the poor slaves immediately feel the effects, for they are harder driven, and the whip is kept more 
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constantly going” (Brown 1854). What is implicit in this statement is that brutality can cause 
increased efficiency, therefore giving the morally unrestrained United States farmers an 
advantage. This is a frightening case to hold up as a model of productivity.    
 
According to the literature, part of the effectiveness of slavery came from the 
organization of labor. Cotton caused the organization of slave labor to shift from task-based to 
gang labor. This transition took away the little autonomy slaves had over their work and instead 
forced them to be watched by overseers. This organization of slaves “further expanded their 
output” due to the “systematic intensification of exploitation” (Beckert 2014). Bill Cooke, a 
scholar of management, argues that “there is no real question...that [the plantation] was a site of 
early development of industrial discipline” and that as productivity increased on American 
farms, cotton industries worldwide were undermined. Sources propose that the gang labor system 
further increased productivity on U.S. farms.   
 
These theorists are not alone in their assessments. Other scholars who attribute the United 
States’ success to the system of slavery include the American Cotton Planner, which noted that 
“the cheapest and most available labor in the world” contributed to economic prosperity (1853).  
Beckert states that the United States’ virtually unlimited supply of slave labor allowed it to excel 
where other countries could not. The De Bow’s Review concurs with this assessment citing that 
“the true limitation upon the production of cotton is labor” (1851).  Torget claims that many 
cotton farmers would not move outside of the United States into Mexico, because it was slavery 
“that made their cotton fields so profitable” (Torget 2015).  Lewis Cecil Gray states that the 
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“unified direction and control” of slaves allowed for an increase in productivity (Gray 1958). 
The system of slavery, according to these sources, provided the United States with an 
irreplaceable advantage.  
 
Furthermore, the case for the productivity of slavery is based, in part, due to the 
perceived inefficiency of other countries’ systems, such as Egypt’s. At the end of the 1800s, 
most of the cotton in the world was grown by quasi-free people; people who often worked as 
sharecroppers or lived in a state of poverty. Many of these people worked or owned their own 
land, however there was a gradual increase in the number of farmers who became wage workers 
for a small amount of money. Beckert bluntly states that “becoming a wage worker was a 
measure of their defeat” (2014). In the case of Egypt, almost 40 percent of all farmers had 
become workers who did not own their own land, but rather worked for pitiful amounts of 
money. Beckert believes that this transition spurred inefficiency in Egypt’s cotton industry. In 
theory, the wage laborers did not provide the same productivity gains as American slaves did.  
 
Discrepancies in the Theories 
Though the literature indicated that the amount of viable land was essential to a cotton 
economy’s success, we found no evidence of a spatial fix in Egypt (as expected by literature) nor 
the United States (which was unexpected by literature). The spatial fix theory presents intrinsic 
discrepancies. The theory assumes that moving to new land will lead to an increase in 
productivity. Yet, newly acquired land could have a number of issues. One of these issues could 
be lower soil quality. One of the implications of expansion is that farmers will be forced to plant 
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in unknown areas. The soil in these new areas could not be as nutrient rich as the land they were 
previously using. In order reach its potential, the land might require different agricultural 
techniques, such as needing to be watered or planted in a different way. Expanding to new land 
might entail planting land that will never be able sustain as much output as the previous, more 
fertile land was able to sustain. Even if the land could sustain sufficient amounts of cotton, 
making the land viable might take time and resources that decrease the overall productivity.  
 
Climate and costs of expansion pose dilemmas for the idea of a spatial fix as well. Even if 
the land itself is fertile and viable, variation in climate conditions could pose problems for 
farmers. The new areas could receive less rainfall or less daylight during their prime growing 
season. Since cotton is very sensitive, changing any conditions when growing cotton can cause 
major changes in cultivation. Farmers who might have mastered familiar land and conditions 
could significantly hurt by expanding into unknown land. Soil quality and climate vary not only 
regionally, but within states as well. Even expansion within close distances could pose problems.  
Furthermore, the costs of expansion could outweigh the benefits. For example, a lack of 
infrastructure could accompany expansion into new territory. If transportation costs offset 
increased output, then productivity could not increase. The proximity of raw cotton markets 
could make a huge impact on productivity levels. The spatial fix theory is widely accepted, but 
there are many complications associated with expansion that could hamper productivity.  
 
Our productivity comparison demonstrates higher productivity in Egypt rather than the 
United States. The idea that slavery is a more effective system than other coerced labor forms is 
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problematic. The literature fails to account for the lack of incentives among slaves and the 
indentured servants of the debt peonage system.  
 
The potential psychological effects of slavery, including depression, anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder, etc. could significantly decrease a worker’s output potential. Slaves 
would be beaten by their masters if they did not harvest a sufficient amount of cotton. Yet, a 
slave did not want to pick too much cotton or the standard expectations of their master would 
increase. Therefore the slaves were not motivated to work to maximum potential, but rather they 
were motivated to work to avoid even more cruelty.  
 
Additionally, the efficiency of plantation-style farms with large slave populations could 
be different from small farms. The majority of American slave owners owned less than three 
slaves (Johnson). Plantation-style farms possessed the ability to discard slaves when they were 
inefficient or injured and replace them with new workers or children. Small farmers did not have 
the same opportunity. With a limited workload, masters could only grow the amount of cotton 
their workers could harvest. Moreover, cotton-farming is said to work best on a large scale 
versus a small scale (Johnson).  Since their amount of labor and resources were limited, the small 
farms could be inefficient enough to offset more productive plantations.  
 
Due to these limits, we expected to find no spatial fix in the United States and we 
expected to find no Egyptian productivity disadvantages. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
 
  In the spatial fix analysis, the provinces, regions, states, and years were the independent 
variables. The acreage, yields, price, and productivity were dependent variables.. Mitchell's 
International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia & Oceania provides Egyptian regional acreage 
data, cotton yields, and price data. The regions used will be Upper and Lower Egypt. Egypt’s 
Annuaire Statistique de L’Egypte gives the provincial acreage data for both Upper and Lower 
Egypt. The 1940 United States Agricultural Census issued the Special Cotton Report that 
provided the entirety of the United States cotton data, with the exception of price data, which 
came from Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics: The Americas. To create the 
productivity graphs, we divided the cotton crude outputs by the acreage data given in our sources 
above. The acreage data and cotton yields were collected in feddans and cantars for Egypt, while 
the data was collected in bales and acres for the United States.  
 
 A basic analysis of the data tables provide a general overview of productivity and acreage 
expansion. However, determining expansion growth rates and productivity growth rates based on 
data from the first and last year of analysis would paint an incomplete picture. We ran a series of 
regressions to represent the changes in expansion and productivity over time. These regressions 
have the ability to represent changes over time because they find the average relationship 
between the independent (time) and dependent (acre expansion and productivity) variables. The 
regressions take all of the data throughout the years and calculate the average amount of acre 
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expansion or productivity per year calculated. These calculations allow us to determine the 
growth rates beyond a simple subtraction of the variables from the last year minus the variables 
from the first year. Instead, we can account for all of the data gathered from year to year. We 
determine the rate of acre expansion by running a regression of the number of acres per state (y) 
on time (x). To determine the regression coefficients to demonstrate the productivity growth rate, 
a regression of the productivity per state (y) on time (x) was calculated. Additionally, we 
calculated the average productivity per state to help us ensure that productivity data remained 
consistent across the years and strengthen our productivity regression coefficients. Pearson 
coefficients allowed us to observe the same thing as the regressions, which was the relationship 
between the two variables observed. However, Pearson coefficients also allowed us to see the 
correlations between the expansion and productivity regressions and then the average 
productivity and expansion regressions.  
 
After we completed our testing of the spatial fix, we began to compare their productivity 
rates to determine whether the U.S. was indeed more productive and lead to their profitability. 
To calculate their productive values, we used our previously collected data from the spatial fix 
theory. Next, we established a common form of measurement and converted our individual units 
to pounds per acre. In order to obtain these units, the United States bales were converted to 
pounds. According to the census, beginning in 1860, 450 pounds of cotton constituted a bale. 
Thus, the number of bales produced nationally in a given year was multiplied by 450. The United 
States data was already recorded in acres, so no other conversions were necessary.  
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In Egypt, we converted feddans to acres. We used multiple cotton conversion charts to 
conclude that there are 1.038 acres in one feddan. Using this information, we multiplied our 
acreage data by 1.038 to properly convert the feddans to acres. Next, we found that there are 50 
kilograms in one cantar and .453 kilograms in one pound. When we divided 50 by .453, we 
calculated that one cantar is approximately 110 pounds. Using this knowledge, we multiplied the 
production data by 110 to convert the cantars to pounds. Once we converted all of the data to 
similar units and divided the pounds by acre, we found the productivity rates for both Egypt and 
the United States from 1880-1940.   
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Spatial Fix in Egypt 
 To achieve a successful spatial fix, the newly introduced land should have contributed to 
an overall higher land usage and ultimately a higher productivity rate due to the use of fresh land. 
We first compared this theory with Egypt. 
 
Hypothetical  
 
Figure 1: Hypothetical acreage expansion by provinces for a nation with a successful spatial fix. 
 
As demonstrated in the hypothetical graph, as time passes, new land is introduced (see 
figure 1). This is shown by new provinces being introduced halfway through our time period and 
the newest provinces appearing towards the end. In addition to the introduction of new 
provinces, those provinces would be increasing in land usage. They would start out with a small 
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amount of land being used, but throughout the years they would quickly expand their land usage 
and plant on fresh land. While the new provinces are increasing, the older provinces would be 
simultaneously decreasing in land usage. They would be replaced with the fresh land and 
depleted soil would be abandoned. 
 
Observed 
 
Figure 2: Observed acreage usage in Lower Egypt by provinces. 
 
 
Figure 3: Observed acreage usage in Upper Egypt by provinces. 
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 Though the graphs does not depict all of the provinces being used in Egypt, the observed 
graphs are able to determine the rate of expansion in both regions of Egypt. Lower Egypt has 
significantly more provinces in use than Upper Egypt, but they attempted to expand into Upper 
Egypt and use the region for production. For the hypothetical spatial fix to have occurred in 
Egypt, the provinces introduced in Upper Egypt during the early 1900s, or were being used the 
least in the 1800s, should have increased in land usage while the dominating provinces during 
the 1800s should have decreased in usage. Our data shows that this is not the case. As shown in 
figure 2, Lower Egypt was introduced into cotton production before Upper Egypt. In Lower 
Egypt, Gharbieh was the original leading province in land usage at about 250,000 feddans. By 
1912, Gharbieh should have decreased in usage to allow for expansion to new, fresh land. 
Gharbieh is still the leading province and shows negative signs of decreasing in land usage. In 
addition, the other provinces of Lower Egypt were increasing at essentially similar rates or not at 
all. Minia, which was introduced in 1897, increased for a couple years but then began to decrease 
and level off.  
 
There was no significant introduction of new, fresh land in Lower Egypt like our results 
for the hypothetical spatial fix. In figure 3, we examine Upper Egypt from 1898 to 1913. Guizeh 
and Assiout show increased usage in land for cotton production during the period, from 10,000 
to 50,000 and 2,000 to 42,000 feddans respectively, while the other three provinces either 
remained stagnant or barely increased. Next we examined all of the regions together.  
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Hypothetical  
 
Figure 4: Hypothetical acreage usage by every province in a nation with a successful spatial fix. 
 
When looking at the provinces in a bar graph for the hypothetical spatial, we can see the 
optimal results in a different way. The old provinces peak early but diminish in land usage 
quickly after (see figure 4). The new provinces would be introduced later but increase in land 
usage at a gradual pace. Lastly, the newest provinces would be introduced last, but would be 
gradually growing in land usage as well. Overall, we would see an expansion into fresh land by 
introduction and increased acreage. 
 
Observed  
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Figure 5: Observed acreage usage by every province in Egypt. 
 When we examine Egypt’s graph, we receive a different result. When put into 
perspective, Upper Egypt’s land usage was minimal and did not show a marginal increase of land 
usage (see figure 5). If they were effectively expanding, provinces from Upper Egypt would 
increase heavily in usage as opposed to remaining stagnant in these new areas. The observed 
graph demonstrated that Egypt was still planting on the same land that they used in 1871 and 
using the same provinces to attempt to increase their land usage on cotton production. 
 
Hypothetical   
 
Figure 6: Hypothetical total acreage usage for cotton production in a nation with a successful 
spatial fix. 
 
In addition to the introduction of new land, the total acreage used would be increasing 
(see figure 6). Although the farmers would abandon depleted land, they would still salvage some 
land in the old provinces while they were expanding. With an optimal spatial fix, the growers 
would have unlimited land and could expand as rapidly as they wanted, while keeping use of 
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healthy land in the old provinces. For Egypt, this would mean that they would expand into Upper 
Egypt and lessen their usage in Lower Egypt. This would cause a steady increase in acreage as 
Upper Egyptian lands are introduced and positively contribute to productivity. 
 
Observed 
 
Figure 7: Observed regional and total acreage usage by Egypt for cotton production. 
 
 When comparing the acreage data, we did find total acreage to be generally increasing 
throughout the years with minor fluctuations (see figure 7). When we analyze Upper and Lower 
Egypt individually, we found Upper Egypt to be producing marginally less than Lower Egypt. 
Since they used less land in Upper Egypt, this was to be expected. However, there were also 
noticeable fluctuations to Upper Egypt acreage, showing unreliability in the region. Although 
Upper Egypt was generally increasing throughout the years, the usage of Lower Egypt was 
increasing simultaneously. Upper Egypt would have to heavily increase in usage for a successful 
expansion to occur. If they were expanding to new land in parts of Lower Egypt but mainly in 
Upper Egypt, the usage of Lower Egypt would be increasing at a slower pace than Upper Egypt.  
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Hypothetical 
 
Figure 8: Hypothetical average total productivity in a nation with a successful spatial fix. 
 
Lastly, an ideal spatial fix would have a positive productivity line. As shown in figure 8, 
the increase in acreage also contributed to increased output. Since the productivity line is 
increasing, this demonstrates that the introduction of new, fresh land allowed this country to 
produce more cotton per acre, as opposed to a decrease in productivity. The latter would indicate 
that the expansion to new land did not assist the states in producing cotton at higher quantities, 
and in turn harmed their cotton production.  
 
Observed 
 
Figure 9: Observed regional and national productivity in Egypt.  
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This was the case in Egypt. When looking at the overall productivity, we calculated that 
both the productivity of the regions and the overall productivity were decreasing as they 
attempted to expand (see figure 9). With their attempt to introduce new land and increase their 
acreage, their productivity decreased and proved that the new land was not efficient or effective 
in their production. The decrease in productivity finalizes our conclusion that Egypt did not 
successfully complete a spatial fix.  
 
Spatial Fix in the United States 
 Table 1: Top producers in the United States by total bale output.
 
 
The first step in determining whether the United States benefitted from a spatial fix was 
to look at sheer output. As shown in table 1, the top producers in 1840 were Mississippi, 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama with 483,504 bales, 408,481 bales, 381,388 bales, and 292,847 
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bales respectively. By 1940, Texas had appeared and dominated cotton production with 
2,724,442 bales. Arkansas also surged from 15,072 bales in 1840 to 1,351,209 bales in 1940. 
Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama all roughly doubled producing 905,088 bales, 717,713 bales, 
and 772,711 bales respectively. Mississippi effectively tripled in output, producing 1,533,092 
bales. Based on our findings, cotton production underwent massive output growth during this 
decade. 
 
 
Figure 10: United States total acreage usage from 1880-1940. 
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Figure 11: United States total bale output from 1880-1940. 
 
According to our data collected, a spatial fix did not occur in the United States. As a 
whole, the United States experienced relatively consistent growth in the number of acres of 
cotton planted until 1930, where the numbers began to rapidly decline (see figure 10). The 
number of bales produced also steadily increased until around 1930 (see figure 11). This was 
inconsistent with the idea of a spatial fix due to the rapid decline of both the bale output and the 
acreage usage, which showed that they were not constantly expanding to new land throughout 
the years and producing higher volumes of cotton. 
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Hypothetical 
Table 2: Hypothetical total productivity for a nation with a successful spatial fix. 
  1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 
Productivity (Bales/Acre) 0.330 0.390 0.410 0.450 0.455 0.500 0.570 
 
For a successful spatial fix to have occurred, both the bale output and acreage would be 
constantly increasing throughout the years, with the bale output increasing at a greater rate than 
the acreage. Therefore, an increase in acreage would lead to an increase in productivity. 
 
 
Observed 
Table 3: Observed total productivity for the United States. 
 
As noted in our Egyptian analysis, in a successful spatial fix, the productivity of the 
country would be increasing as new land was being introduced (see table 2). Starting in 1880, we 
computed a productivity measure of bales per acre (see table 3). The United States’ productivity 
table indicates that productivity remained generally consistent until 1940 as well, where there 
was a significant increase. This was still inconsistent with our hypothetical chart because they 
did not increase in productivity throughout the years, even though they were expanding to new 
areas. This furthered the idea that the United States was not expanding effectively like it has 
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been assumed by the literature. However, this was not enough to disprove the theory of a spatial 
fix. In order to better understand whether a spatial fix was influencing the cotton industry, it 
became necessary to look at the productivity differences at the state level.  
 
Observed 
 
Figure 12: Observed acreage usage by states in the United States. 
 
Once again, on the interregional level, in a hypothetical scenario the newer land 
introduced will begin to exceed the land that was being used in the earlier years (see figure 1). In 
addition, the older areas will also begin to decline.  
 
As shown in figure 12, data from the individual states did not show the results that a 
spatial fix expected. With the exception of Texas, the other states appear to frequently intersect 
and remain relatively in the same range in terms of acreage. Although Texas was introduced later 
and greatly increased in acreage (similar to the hypothetical graph) the other states did not give 
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an indication of actively introducing new land or discarding old land. For the United States to 
demonstrate introduction of removal of areas, there would be positive or negative trends in each 
state as opposed to slight fluctuations. Similar to Egypt, there is no evidence of new, viable land 
being introduced in the United States and replacing worn out land. 
 
Hypothetical 
Table 4: Hypothetical productivity by states in a nation with a successful spatial fix. 
State 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 
Alabama 0.403 0.407 0.411 0.415 0.297 0.322 0.213 
Arkansas 0.263 0.267 0.265 0.271 0.273 0.332 0.263 
Georgia 0.431 0.442 0.439 0.465 0.453 0.323 0.223 
Louisiana 0.214 0.217 0.223 0.201 0.212 0.221 0.214 
Mississippi 0.391 0.393 0.389 0.394 0.368 0.410 0.374 
South Carolina 0.281 0.285 0.284 0.281 0.294 0.295 0.284 
Texas 0.405 0.465 0.549 0.637 0.678 0.812 0.569 
 
As shown in the table 4, the expanding states would be experiencing higher productivity 
than the older ones in a hypothetical spatial fix. The states with higher acreage growth are 
producing more cotton bales, due to their use of fresh land, and thus have a higher rate of 
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productivity.  
 
Observed 
Table 5: Observed productivity by states in the United States 
 
 
Table 5 shows the productivity measures of each top producing state between 1880 and 
1940. When we observed the United States productivity numbers, all of the states experienced 
fluctuations in their productivity without notable increases or decreases. In addition, all of the 
states increased their productivity in 1940. This is contrary to the hypothetical table because 
since every state decreased their acreage, their productivity should have decreased as a result. By 
1930, some states, such Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, had experienced productivity 
gains; but others, namely Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, decreased in productivity overall.  The 
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variation in productivity levels in the observed table shows that they were not using their land 
introduction effectively and did not suggest a spatial fix. 
 
Hypothetical  
Table 6: Hypothetical regressions for a nation with a successful spatial fix. 
State: Number of Acres (y) 
on Time (x) 1880-
1940 
Productivity 
(Bales/Acres) on Time 
Regression Coefficient 
1880-1940 
Average Productivity 
1880-1940 
Total US 287722 .0075 .75 
Texas 171792 .0065 .62 
Oklahoma 53977 .0043 .59 
Arkansas 26589 .0032 .54 
Mississippi 11900 .0021 .46 
North Carolina 7104 .0010 .41 
Virginia 6176 .0005 .29 
Kentucky 2872 .00002 .24 
South Carolina -116 .000011 .13 
 
Table 7: Hypothetical Pearson Coefficients for a nation with a successful spatial fix. 
Acre on Productivity .8580 
Acre on Average Productivity .7490 
 
 In a hypothetical spatial fix, the states with the higher regression coefficients regarding 
the number of acres on time would also have the highest productivity regression coefficients (see 
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table 6). Subsequently, the Pearson Coefficients would be positive, significant numbers (see 
table 7). 
Observed 
Table 8: Observed regressions and Pearson coefficients for the United States. 
 
The final step in testing whether a spatial fix affected productivity in the United States 
was to run a series of regressions. A regression of the number of acres on time was computed for 
each state between 1880 and 1940. The states with the highest regression coefficients were 
Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, meaning that these states were expanding the fastest. Then, a 
regression of the productivity measure on time was computed. However, as shown in table 8, the 
highest regression coefficients for productivity on time were Missouri, Kentucky, South 
Carolina, and North Carolina. Our observed results were not similar to the hypothetical results 
that should have occurred. These results demonstrated that the states that were expanding the 
fastest were not necessarily the states that were the most productive. Of the top productive states, 
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Missouri ranks 6th out of 14 states regarding expansion, showing that the American farmers 
were not simply using the expansion of land to increase their productivity.  Finally, in order to 
ensure the results remain relatively consistent across states, the average productivity per state 
was calculated. The states with the highest average productivity were Missouri, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina, which were the same states that received the highest regression 
coefficients for productivity on time. These findings proved that our data was consistent 
throughout the decades. A basic examination of the regression coefficients led us to believe that 
a spatial fix was not a factor in the productivity of the United States cotton industry.  
 
Even so, in order to numerically determine the correlation between acreage and 
productivity, we employed Pearson coefficients. In a hypothetical spatial fix, the Pearson 
coefficient between the regression of number of acres on time and the regression of productivity 
on time would be a positive, significant number. However, the observed Pearson coefficient was 
-0.367, which was both negative and inconsistent (see table 8). To review our work, The Pearson 
coefficient between the regression of number of acres on time and the average productivity per 
state was calculated as well. This coefficient should have also been positive and significant. We 
calculated the coefficient to be -0.282, which was negative and even more insignificant. These 
were the opposite of the results that would be expected from a successful spatial fix. Therefore, 
we concluded that there is no evidence of a spatial fix in the United States. 
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Comparative Productivity 
Table 9: Total acreage, output, price, and cotton productivity of the United States and Egypt. 
NATION DATE LAND (acres) PRODUCT (lbs) 
PRICE  
(dollars per lb) 
PRODUCTIVITY 
(lbs per acre) 
US COTTON 
 
 
 
 
1880 14,480,019 2,589,911,550 0.1165 179 
1890 20,175,270 3,362,629,950 0.1016 167 
1900 24,275,101 4,290,618,150 0.0781 177 
1910 32,043,838 4,792,170,600 0.1403 150 
1920 33,740,106 5,119,258,500 0.3574 152 
1930 43,227,488 6,558,482,250 0.1424 152 
1940 22,811,004 5,166,585,000 0.1041 226 
EGYPT COTTON 
 
 
 
1880 800,137 290,840,000 0.0014 363 
1890 948,146 523,490,000 0.0014 552 
1900 1,297,380 670,230,000 0.0011 517 
1910 1,776,268 802,890,000 0.0022 452 
1920 1,707,510 679,910,000 0.0104 398 
1930 1,742,802 785,950,000 0.0023 468 
1940 1,235,220 646,140,000 0.0020 523 
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Since the United States’ lack of spatial fix was contrary to our original hypothesis, we 
compared the productivity levels between Egypt and the United States (see table 9). The 
productivity differences between the nations are surprisingly significant, but not in the way the 
literature would have predicted. When comparing the acres used throughout the years, we found 
over ten times as much usage of land by the United States and steadily increasing land usage 
until 1940, during the mechanization of cotton. In Egypt, there was significantly less land used 
for cotton production. As a result, the United States produced more cotton throughout the years 
as well, with their only decrease in production being in 1940. Egypt generally increased yet had 
greater fluctuations in their pounds produced throughout the decades. Finally, the United States 
charged a significantly higher selling price per pound for their cotton, while Egypt struggled in 
selling their cotton for a competitive wage. 
 
Although the United States lead in acreage, product, and price, Egypt was more 
productive than the United States per acre used. For every decade between 1880 and 1940, Egypt 
had a higher productivity measure than the United States. The starkest differences occur in 1890 
when Egypt’s productivity measure was 3.31 times greater than that of the United States. At their 
closest, Egypt’s productivity was still 2.03 times greater than the U.S.’ productivity. On average, 
between 1880 and 1940, Egypt was 2.75 times more productive than the U.S. without the use of 
slave labor.  
 
This finding is contrary to what the literature suggested. Even though the analysis takes 
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place after the antebellum era, the system of debt peonage maintains the forced labor findings. 
Therefore, the United States’ darkest chapter in history was not only inhumane, but 
unproductive. Southern planters justified the enslavement of African Americans because they 
perceived the system to be an economic necessity (Johnson 2007). However, the results imply 
that the United States did not only build its power by enslaving an entire race of people, it did so 
without economic benefit. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our research suggests that the spatial fix theory was wrong in the case of the United 
States cotton industry. David Harvey’s spatial fix theory predicted that the United States’ vast 
amounts of land and ability to expand contributed to increased productivity. We determined that 
the United States did not produce a successful spatial fix and actually decreased in productivity 
throughout the decades. Although the U.S. were expanding in land use and increasing in 
production, this land did not produce more cotton per acre; thus, the productivity measures 
disproved the theory of a David Harvey “spatial fix” in the United States. 
 
Our research also suggests that coerced labor did not successfully increase productivity in 
the United States. Many sources indicated that the United States’ slavery and debt-peonage 
system contributed to increased productivity and therefore led to increased profitability. We 
found that Egypt, using their corvee labor system, produced two to three times as much cotton 
per acre than the United States. This conclusion further taints the idea of slavery because it 
implies that hypothetically the United States could have employed a different system of labor 
and become more productive, and thus more profitable.  
 
The external limitations of our study are mainly centered on the lack of data availability. 
The United States only provided acreage data beginning in 1880, so our analysis excluded the 
antebellum area and Egypt’s prosperity during the American Civil War. Additionally, Egypt was 
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unable to produce correlation coefficients due to the lack of consistent decadal data. Therefore, 
although the quantitative analyses were not as directly comparative as we would have hoped, 
they provided sufficient trends to reach our conclusions.  
 
Additionally, we planned to test more countries to further strengthen our argument. A 
larger sample size would diminish the margin of error. However, due to time constraints, we 
were limited to examining only the two nations. However, the United States and Egypt were the 
quintessential examples of cotton economies and provided prime cases for the theories explored. 
Therefore, even though our study is not wide in scope, it gives a solid indication of these 
theories. 
 
According to the secondary sources, there were two other unsubstantiated theories we 
found could be the answer to the United States’ prosperity. Mowery’s Technology and the 
Pursuit of Economic Growth provides a historical account on the importance of technological 
innovation from an economic standpoint. Furthermore, Landes’s The Unbound Prometheus 
details innovations that aided in the development of Western Europe and concluded that 
technology positively correlates with education levels, with the more educated societies 
experiencing higher economic growth (Landes 1991). Without developments in technology, an 
agricultural society cannot hope to reach the efficiency and production levels of developing 
nations.  
  
The underdevelopment theory also could explain why other cotton economies failed to 
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develop in the way the United States’ did. Frank’s The Development of Underdevelopment and 
Chang’s Bad Samaritans: Rich Nations, Poor Policies, and the Threat to the Developing World 
provide evidence that an exploitative relationship with a rich nation led many poorer nations into 
a cycle of debt and dependence (1966, 2007). Chossudovsky’s The Globalization of Poverty 
affirms the importance of debt repayment in the economic development of nations (1998). Egypt 
in particular suffered from an insurmountable debt crisis that forced it to pay creditors all of their 
cotton trade profits (Owen 1969). Furthermore, the existence of tariffs in America kept foreign 
competition overwhelming local markets, whereas nations like Egypt were flooded with British 
imports (Chang 2007). These imports kept the nations from supporting a successful cotton-
manufacturing sector (Chang 2007).  
  
The exploration of these theories are an important next step in research because the 
discrepancy in long-term success between the United States and other cotton economies still 
merits investigation. Currently, research and literature paints a contrasting and incomplete view 
of this phenomenon.  
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